interests. Public goods refer to resources from which all members of a group may benefit regardless of whether they have contributed to a resource. In a typical public-goods game, five group members contribute their endowments to either a group or personal account. Endowments in the personal account are kept by the individual, while the amount of endowments in the group account is doubled, and then distributed to all five members equally, regardless of each participant's contribution. In such dilemmas, uncooperative behavior on the personal level brings the best pay-off for the individual, whereas group interests are best met if all members choose cooperation (Van Dijk, De Kwaadsteniet, & De Cremer, 2009 ).
A negative bias, which has been observed frequently in previous studies, occurs when negative or bad behaviors, or information, have a greater influence on individuals than the equivalent behaviors or information that are positive or good (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) . Because public-goods dilemmas are situations where the behaviors of individuals are largely influenced by others, it is reasonable to ask whether an uncooperative behavior (the bad apple) has a greater influence than an equivalent cooperative behavior (the good apple) in public-goods dilemmas. Therefore, first goal of the present study is to replicate the bad apple effect in public-goods dilemmas, while controlling the overall contributions of the group members to the group's account. The second goal of the present study is to examine whether a bad apple has a greater influence on individuals than an equivalent good apple.
The Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation
Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 4 Empirical studies have provided strong evidence that an individual's cooperation in public-goods dilemmas may be decreased by the uncooperative behaviors of others (Van Dijk, Wilke, & Wit, 2003; Bardsley & Sausgruber, 2005; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2008; Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009) . In these studies, one of the most notable phenomenon is the bad apple effect, in which an uncooperative behavior (the bad apple) reduces other group members' willingness and tendencies to cooperate (Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, & Van Lange, 2005) . Rutte and Wilke (1992) found that when there was only one bad apple in the group, participants decreased their cooperation at a rate of 20% to 50%, but the rate did not change as the number of bad apples increased (Kerr, Rumble, Park, Ouwerkerk, Parks, Gallucci, & Van Lange, 2009 ).
Unfortunately, most of these studies had the common flaw of confusing the effect of the bad apple with the effect of the overall contribution to the group. For example, Kerr et al. (2009) manipulated the number of bad apples by giving participants a table of allocation decisions from another five-person group. In this table, they varied the number of bad apples (who put 0 dollars into the group account) from 0 to 4, while the remainders of the members allocated 3 or 4 dollars to the group account. If there were no bad apples in the group, the five digits on the table would be 3, 4, 3, 4, 3 (sum: 17) , and if there was one bad apple, the five digits would be 0, 4, 3, 4, 3 (sum: 14) . There were two main differences between these two conditions. Regardless of the sum of the five numbers, there was a complete uncooperative behavior in the one-bad-apple condition (the effect of the bad apple). The second difference was that the sum of money allocated to the group account in the one-bad-apple condition was less than the sum in the no-bad-apple condition (the effect of the overall contribution).
Few studies have distinguished the effect of the bad apple from the effect of the overall Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 5 contribution to the group account. Ouwerkerk et al. (2005) described an unpublished study conducted by Ouwerkerk, Van Lange, Gallucci, and Van Vugt (2004) in a chapter of a book titled The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying. This study found that even when controlling the overall contribution, the bad apple could decrease the cooperation of participants. This study suggested that cooperation can be decreased by the bad apple, although the bad apple could not influence the final revenue of participants. However, this study did not consider the role of individual differences in the bad apple effect.
It is well accepted that the behaviors of individuals are determined by situational factors as well as personal traits (Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2009; Nestler & Egloff, 2012) . For example, researchers have repeatedly found that individuals with high Honesty-Humility were more cooperative than individuals with low Honesty-Humility (Hilbig & Zettler, 2009; Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012; Zettler, Hilbig, & Heydasch, 2013) . Moreover, they have found interaction effects of the Honesty-Humility and situational factors on the cooperation of participants.
Among all personality variables, the social value orientation is one of the most important variables accounting for individual differences in public-goods dilemmas (Cornelissen, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2011) . Social value orientation is a psychological variable defined as a person's preference about how to allocate resources (e.g. money) between oneself and another person. Most people can be classified into one of three patterns of social value orientation: prosocial, individualist, or competitor (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997; Van Lange, 1999) .
Prosocial individuals attempt to maximize group joint outcomes as well as equality for each member's outcomes; individualists try to maximize their own outcomes without concern for others' outcomes; and competitors are motivated to maximize the difference of outcomes between themselves and others. In previous studies, individualists and competitors were often grouped together to form one group, the proself (Van Lange et al., 1997; .
In the book, The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying, Ouwerkerk et al. (2005) reported the results of an unpublished study conducted by Reinders Folmer (2003) . This study found that individuals with a proself orientation were more inclined to follow the behavior of a bad apple than individuals with a prosocial orientation. However, the specific experimental design and data of this study were unclear because it was unpublished. Therefore, the aim of Study 1 were to replicate the bad apple effect while controlling overall contribution, and to examine whether individuals with different social value orientations have different responses to the bad apple. The aim of Study 2 was to examine whether an equivalent good apple (a cooperative behavior) can inhibit the bad apple effect, and the effects of individual differences.
Theoretical Background
There are two possible explanations for the bad apple effect. First, some studies suggested that people are reluctant to become the most uncooperative person within a certain group because the most uncooperative member is usually punished or excluded by the group in the real world (Sugden, 1984; Kurzban, McCabe, Smith, & Wilson, 2001) . This social norm is so powerful that participants will obey it even though there are no obvious punishments for failing to do so.
Because of the existence of the bad apple, even slight contributions will make the participants look more generous than the bad apple. Hence, participants can decrease their cooperation without Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 7 fearing social punishment. We call this theory the selfishness explanation.
Second, both Equity Theory and Justice Theory suggested that people generally try to maintain a sense of equity in their interpersonal relationship of daily life (Pritchard, 1969; Carrell & Dittrich, 1978; Tyler, 2012) . In public-goods dilemmas, if most of members' contributions are similar, individuals are more likely to pay attention to extreme behaviors which are different from others. Thus, if equity were to be undermined by an extreme behavior, such as the bad apple, participants' attentions might be attracted by it, and therefore they might slightly reduce their cooperation to restore equity. We call this theory the equity explanation.
Proselfs and prosocials may have different views about the same situational information, behaviors, or tasks. Proselfs value their own outcomes as more important than others' outcomes and the equity. They view the bad apple in terms of power and dominance, and they behave in an uncooperative way depending on their internal motives. It seems as though proselfs will exhibit cooperative behaviors only if there are enough external reasons (e.g., punishment, ostracize) to do so. Proselfs may cooperate because they fear being ostracized or punished by the group. However, proselfs will decrease cooperation in the one-bad-apple situation because the bad apple has beard the risks of this social punishment. For proselfs, then, the selfishness explanation is more appropriate and reasonable than equity explanation.
In contrast to the proselfs, prosocials are inclined to value the group's outcomes and the equity as more important than their own outcomes, viewing uncooperative behavior as a moral concern (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986) . Prosocials cooperate by following internal instead of external motives; thus, there is no chance for the bad apple to obstruct the prosocials' external motives. It is more likely that prosocials will reduce their cooperation in the Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 8 one-bad-apple situation in their attempt to recover the equity that was lost because of the bad apple. For prosocials, the equity explanation is more appropriate and reasonable than the selfishness explanation. Based on previous studies and theories, we hypothesized that the bad apple would decrease both the proselfs' and prosocials' cooperation even when controlling the overall contribution (Hypothesis 1).
In comparing a bad with a good apple, the overall contribution must be controlled, because the overall contribution will also influence participants' cooperation. If everyone has an initial endowment of 10, manipulating two persons' contributions from (5, 5) to (0, 10) will be most suitable for the purpose of the present study. Therefore, in the present study, the (5, 5) was referred to as the congruent condition where there was no bad or good apple, while the (10, 0) was referred to as the incongruent condition where there was both a good and a bad apple.
Because prosocials and proselfs are influenced by the bad apple for different reasons, it is possible that people with different social value orientations will have different reactions to the incongruent information. Since the cooperation of proselfs is mainly driven by external motives which have nothing to do with the good apple; adding a good apple should not change the effect of the bad apple. However, it is more paradoxical for prosocials who value group outcomes and equity. Given that group outcomes do not vary in the incongruent condition, equity is the only factor that prosocials should consider. Whenever prosocials increase or decrease their cooperation, there will be a lack of equity among all of group members. It is believed that prosocials will deal with the incongruent information in a compromising way which may keep their cooperation constant between the congruent and incongruent conditions. In keeping with previous theories and research, we hypothesized that proselfs would contribute less in the incongruent condition than in Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 9 the congruent condition (Hypothesis 2), and that prosocials' contributions would not be significantly different between the incongruent condition and the congruent condition (Hypothesis
3).
Two studies were conducted to test our hypotheses. The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the bad apple effect while controlling the overall contribution. The purpose of Study 2 was to examine (a) whether a bad apple has a greater influence on individuals' cooperation than a good apple, and (b) the role of social value orientation.
Study 1: Social value orientation and the bad apple effect

Method
Participants and Design
Participants consisted of 96 undergraduate students (56 females, 40 males; mean age = 23.53 years, SD = 3.79) who were recruited from a university in China through online advertisements that invited students to take part in a social interaction study. The study used a 2 (social value orientation: prosocial vs. proself) × 2 (the bad apple: present vs. not present) between-group design.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were brought to a cubicle furnished with a table and a chair. After participants first completed the measurement of social value orientation, they were told that this is a five-person game, and members of the group did not and would never know each other. At the beginning of each task, every participant received an endowment of 10 yuan (Chinese currency; 1 Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 10 yuan is worth approximately 0.16 US dollars). Participants were informed that they could decide to put any amount of the endowment into a group account, and the remaining money would be placed into a personal account. Money in the personal account was kept by the individual. The amount of money contributed to the group account would be doubled, and then distributed to all five members equally, regardless of each participant's contribution. Participants were told that, after the experiment, they would be paid as the outcome of the task. Then participants were required to answer several questions about the task to make sure they completely understood it.
When participants completely understood the task, they were informed that because of a limit equipment, some individuals had already made their decision about allocating their money in a prior experiment (actually there were no other experiments). However, these people had not received payment, which would now be determined by the behaviors of all five persons in the game. Before participants made their decisions to allocate their money, they were presented with two pieces of information about the behaviors of the other four persons (the number of bad apples and the overall contribution). For the overall contribution, all participants were told that the average amount of money contributed to the group account by the other four persons was 7 yuan.
For the bad apple condition, one-half of participants were told that there is one person who contributed zero to the group account; and the other half of participants were told that no person contributed zero to the group account. Then, participants made their decisions, got their payment, and were debriefed.
Measurement of Social Value Orientation
The nine-item version of the Triple-Dominance Measure was used to assess participants' These results support Hypothesis 1 that the bad apple would decrease the cooperation of the prosocials and proselfs, controlling for the overall contribution. However, the underlying psychological processes for prosocials and proselfs may be different. For prosocials, the bad apple lowered the equity of the group, so prosocials may have reduced their contribution in order to recover the equity. Since the bad apple made the lowest contribution to the group, proselfs could behave in accordance with their true intention of maximizing their self-interests without fearing social punishment. We conducted a direct comparison of a bad with a good apple in Study 2, and expected to observe individual differences of social value orientation on cooperation. 
Study 2: Compare the Bad Apple with the Good Apple
Participants and Design
Participants were 84 undergraduate students (50 females, 34males; mean age = 20.42 years, SD = 1.51), who were recruited from a university in China through online advertisements that invited students to take part in a social interaction study. The study was 2 (social value orientation:
prosocial vs. proself) × 2 (feedback information: incongruent vs. congruent) between-group design.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were brought to a cubicle furnished with a table and a chair.
Participants completed the social value orientation measure, and were told about the game, and that five participants would be competing at the same time. The task was the same as the task used in Study 1. In actuality, the other four members of the group, except for the real participant, were fictitious people.
At the beginning of the task, the participants were told that each of the five group members would be named, A, B, C, D, or E. Participants A and B were assigned to make decisions during phase 1, and participants C, D, and E were assigned to make decisions during phase 2. In phase 2, participants C, D, and E were given feedback about A and B's behavior. Participants were told that their symbolic names were randomly assigned, but in fact, all of them received the name of C.
There were two feedback conditions: in the first condition, A and B contributed 5 yuan to the group account respectively (congruent condition); in the second condition, one group member, either A or B, contributed 0 yuan to the group account, while the other fictional participants contributed 10 yuan to the group account (incongruent condition). The behaviors of A and B were
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After receiving the feedback, participants answered questions about the amount of money A and B, respectively, contributed to the group account. All participants answered this question correctly. Then, participants made their decisions, received their payment, and were debriefed.
Measurement of Social Value Orientation
Six primary items of the Slider Measure were used to assess participants' social value orientation (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011) . For each item of the Slider measure, participants indicated their preferred own-other outcome allocation by selecting one of nine options. Based on a participant's choices on the primary six items, the social value orientation angle (SVO°) is computed. Participants' scores were categorized to form the following types:
Altruism ( SVO° > 57.15°); Prosocial ( 22.45° < SVO° < 57.15°); Individualist ( −12.04°< SVO° < 22.45°); Competitor (SVO° < −12.04°); see Murphy et al. (2011) .
Using this scoring, 56 of 84 (67%) participants were classified as prosocial, 26 (31%) as individualists, and two (2%) as competitors. Individualists and competitors were combined to form the proself group (n = 28).
Results and Discussion
A 2 by 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of feedback information, F(1,80) = 4.72, p < .05, η p 2 = .06, a significant main effect of social value orientation, F(1,80) = 4.49, p < .05, η p 2 = .05, and a significant interaction effect of the two independent variables, F(1,80) = 5.34, p < .05, η p 2 = .06 (see Figure 2 ). For prosocials, the effect of feedback information was not significant, more likely to make their dcisions based on equity. In the incongruent information situation, the simplest way to maintain equity was to keep their cooperation constant.
General Discussion
Although there were many studies about the bad apple effect in public-goods dilemmas (Felps, Mitchell, & Byington, 2006; Kerr et al., 2009) , few of them distinguished the effect of the bad apple from the effect of the overall contribution (Ouwerkerk et al., 2005) . The present study replicated previous results by showing the bad apple could still decrease participants' cooperation even when controlling the overall contribution (Study 1). Study 2 extended our understanding of the bad apple effect by showing that an equivalent cooperative behavior could inhibit the bad apple effect for prosocials.
The mechanism of the bad apple effect may be that people reduce their contributions to recover the equity that is reduced by the bad apple; and another possibility is that people behave in accordance with their true intention, without fear of social punishment, because the bad apple is the lowest contributor of the group (Sugden, 1984; Kerr et al., 2009) . In the present study, the former explanation is more valid for prosocials and the latter one is more valid for proselfs. The feedback information (incongruent vs. congruent) was manipulated in Study 2 to examine these explanations. If individuals value a good apple more than a bad apple, they should contribute more in the incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. However, if individuals value a bad apple more than a good one, their contributions should be smaller in the incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. Study 2 found an interaction effect of the feedback information and the social value orientation of participants. Specifically, for prosocials, cooperation was not influenced by the incongruent information: a bad apple did not have a larger effect than a good apple. However, the incongruent information significantly decreased the cooperation of proselfs, which implies that a bad apple had a greater effect on the cooperation of proselfs than a good apple did.
The bad apple and good apple may convey contrasting information, namely, that the bad apple indicates risk, noncooperation, and self-interest, whereas the good apple indicates trust, cooperation, and group goals. The results of Study 2 suggest that prosocials pay the same amount of attention to the bad apple and good apple, and try to establish a balance point between the two disparate behaviors, whereas proselfs limit their attention to only the bad apple. These results are consistent with the findings and explanations of Study 1. Proselfs decreased their cooperation in the one bad apple condition, apparently because of their selfish motives; and they also decreased their cooperation when simultaneously presented with both a good apple and a bad apple because the presence of a good apple was not able to inhibit these motives. By contrast, prosocials apparently were more likely to be concerned with equity which would be lowered by the bad apple.
Whether prosocials increased or decreased their cooperation in the incongruent condition, it would lowered equity of the group. Therefore, prosocials kept their contributions constant in the incongruent and congruent conditions to maintain relative equity. However, we did not measure participants' motives or their underlying psychological processes in the present study, so the results are not conclusive. Studies that reveal direct evidence of motives and similar variables should be conducted in the future.
Although negative bias has been identified in many other studies (Baumeister et al., 2001) , only partial evidence of it is revealed in the present study. The bad apple had a greater influence showing that prosocials are concerned with group outcomes and equity, whereas proselfs are only concerned with self-interests (Van Lange et al., 1997; ).
The present study also extended our understanding of the bad apple effect by showing a cross-cultural consistency in research findings. Previous studies of the bad apple effect were, for the most part, conducted in Western countries that are usually regarded as having an individualistic culture. However, the present study was conducted in China which is considered as having a collectivistic culture. Individualistic cultures emphasize personal achievement regardless of the expense of group, whereas collectivistic cultures emphasize family and work group goals above individual needs or desires (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 1989) . Some researchers suggest that culture not only influences individuals to be more or less cooperative, but may also affect whether and how other factors influence cooperation (Wagner, 1995; Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998) . However, the present study did not obtain cultural differences, and the bad apple effect was still observed among Chinese participants. The consistency of these results may have great implications for both public-goods dilemmas and cross-cultural studies.
The present study provides a new way to protect the public goods against exploitation by the bad apple. Other studies suggest that punishment and ostracism would restrain the bad apple effect Kerr et al., 2009 ), but sanctions would probably undermine people's trust in others, especially when the level of trust was initially high (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006) . Our results suggest that encouraging the good apple may be a better way to shield Bad Apple Effect and Social Value Orientation 19 the group from the bad apple, at least for prosocials whose level of trust is high.
Although the present studies replicated previous research and extended the findings of the bad apple effect in public-goods dilemmas, it has some limitations. First, a one-trial public-goods game was used, therefore, it is unclear how individuals would have responded to a multi-trial game and whether that would have affected the differences between the proselfs and prosocials.
Second, the assumed processes were not measured or manipulated in the present study; hence, the underlying psychological mechanism of the bad apple effect was only supported indirectly. Third, the sample size of proselfs was somewhat small (30 proselfs in Study 1 and 28 proselfs in Study 2).
All of these limitations should be considered in future studies.
